Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations
By: Plasmans, Joseph [author.].
Contributor(s): Engwerda, Jacob [author.] | van Aarle, Bas [author.] | di Bartolomeo, Giovanni [author.] | Michalak, Tomasz [author.] | SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type:
BookSeries: Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance: 8Publisher: Boston, MA : Springer US, 2006.Description: XVI, 324 p. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780387279312.Subject(s): Operations research | Decision making | Economic theory | Macroeconomics | European Economic Community literature | Economics | Economics | European Integration | Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics | Economic Systems | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods | Operation Research/Decision TheoryDDC classification: 337.142 Online resources: Click here to access online | Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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E books
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PK Kelkar Library, IIT Kanpur | Available | EBK5504 |
International Policy Coordination -- Mathematical Background -- The Basic Symmetric Two-Country Model -- An MU Model with Active Monetary Policy -- Endogenous Coalition Formation Concepts -- A Multi-Country Closed-Economy MU Model -- Accession to a Monetary Union -- World-wide Regional Policy Coordination -- Concluding Remarks.
Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.
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